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Defective Products in a Defective
System: Legislation Designed to Level
the Playing Field in International
Trade
By Jessica Shelton*

I. INTRODUCTION
The global marketplace is a prominent and still-rising force in
the ever-increasing
to
contributing
trade,
international
of affordable
the
availability
fueling
while
trade
globalization of
products to satisfy the demands of consumers worldwide. For the
United States, this translates into massive volumes of imported
1
foreign products flowing in the American stream of commerce.
All too often, these more affordable foreign-manufactured products
prove defective, inevitably resulting in a variety of physical
injuries and financial losses for many unlucky American
consumers. When this happens, those injured naturally demand
legal redress, usually in U.S. courts, and this means they must
navigate the exceedingly complicated field of transnational
* Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University, School of Law, 2011; B.A.
Stonehill College, 2008. The author would like to express her appreciation to
her friends and editors, Rebecca Aitchison, Dan Hirseman, Marissa Janton,
and Rachael Schupp-Star. Special thanks to Professor Louise Ellen Teitz for
her keen insight and guidance.
1. Leveling the Playing Field and Protecting Americans: Holding
ForeignManufacturersAccountable HearingBefore the Subcomm. On Admin.
Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
(2009) (statement of Thomas L. Gowen, Partner, Locks Law Firm)
[hereinafter Gowen, Leveling the Playing Field] (noting that the U.S.
imported 2.6 trillion worth of goods in 2006, and the volume of imports has
grown over 300% over the last decade, and is expected to triple again by
2015).
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litigation and substantive law even to begin the process of suing
those responsible.
Indeed, the current system of holding foreign manufacturers
of defective products accountable is itself defective: when faulty
products enter the U.S. from abroad and subsequently injure
American consumers, lengthy and unfair battles over procedure
characterize any litigation that ensues. Plaintiffs often see their
cases travel up to the Supreme Court of the United States solely
on preliminary matters such as personal jurisdiction, and the
front-loaded costs of litigating these initial legal matters
frequently deplete plaintiffs resources, thus depriving them of the
ability to pursue the merits of the case. 2 In short, the U.S. legal
system has not paralleled the advances in international trade and
commerce, and thus it inescapably fails to account for the
difficulty of successfully suing foreign manufacturers of these
defective goods. "American jurisdictional law is simply not fit for
export," but is rather the result of decades of complicated and
3
confused case law and efforts to formulate standards and rules.
Suing foreign defendants presents a variety of hurdles, and
successful litigation and meaningful compensation entails a
"chase" that is inescapably "tricky" and frustrating. 4
2. See, e.g., D'Jamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft Ctr., Inc., No. 09-489, 2009 WL
3444799, at *1-24 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2009)(petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court for
writ of certiorari solely on the issue of whether purposeful availment of the
market of the U.S. as a whole, which creates general jurisdiction over federal
claims, also creates specific jurisdiction in a state in which harm occurs as a
result of purposeful availment of the national market).
3. Friedrich K. Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 111, 117 (1998).
In consequence of well over a century of experimentation and
vacillation, we are stuck with a confused, unwieldy and, at times,
unfair Supreme Court case law. In contrast to not only civil law
nations but also other common law countries, to this day we lack a
rational catalog of jurisdictional bases. Instead of reasonably clear
and cogent provisions, as they are found throughout the civilized
world, we rely on a jumble of state long-arm statutes and Supreme
Court case law that is chaotic and incoherent. Not only practitioners
and lower state and federal judges, but even law professors and, at
times, Supreme Court Justices, find it difficult to make sense out of
the hodgepodge of majority, concurring and dissenting opinions and
the Court's opaque terminology.
Id.
4. See Porter, Rebecca, Attorneys Seek MDL to Scale Chinese Drywall
Problem, 45 TRIAL 64, 66 (2009) [hereinafter Porter, Chinese Drywall MDL].
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This is hardly a novel concern. In truth, it has plagued
American consumers for years. Recent contamination scares and
other unsafe products have led to increased media coverage and
5
attention, but these problems are by no means new ones.
Currently, there are several legislative efforts to correct the
problem, or at the very least ameliorate any number of the
procedural hurdles that U.S. plaintiffs face when seeking legal
redress against foreign defendants. Testimony in support of one
such bill included the assertion that "[i]t is unfair to handicap
injured American citizens and provide foreign tortfeasors with a
technical defense simply because our court system is not
organized on the same basis as our markets," and thus legislation
to correct this imbalance and thereby "level the playing field" is
6
not only necessary, but overdue.
This Comment discusses the major arguments for and against
the passage of legislation that would require foreign
manufacturers to consent to jurisdiction and service of process
before participating in trade with the U.S. Section II provides
relevant background information, including pertinent examples of
defective products that accounted for the increased media
attention this situation has received, as well as brief accounts of
each procedural hurdle faced by U.S. plaintiffs, including personal
jurisdiction, service of process, and enforcement of judgments.
Section II also gives a detailed account of the disadvantages to
U.S. consumers, manufacturers, and distributors that come about
as a result of the U.S. legal system. Section III explores
legislative efforts to remedy trade and procedural inequities, using
S. 1606, the Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of

5. Gowen, Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 1 (asserting that
"foreign manufacturers enthusiastically seek access to the American market
but assiduously seek to avoid responsibility and accountability in American
courts for injuries caused by their products"). See also infra pp. 4-5 for
examples of harmful defective products and contamination scares in the U.S.
6. See Gowen, Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 1. At the hearing,
Senator Whitehouse maintained that his legislation would require that a

manufacturer who imports goods into the U.S. must designate an agent for

service of process who will accept the legal papers required to initiate a
lawsuit, and it would likewise require the development of a register of these
agents so that an injured American can inform the manufacturer defendant
of a lawsuit quickly and cheaply. This proposal is discussed in much greater
detail below. See infra Section III.
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2009, as the primary vehicle to discuss the most appropriate
means to achieve this end. 7 Section IV then examines the
intricacies and problematic issues imposed by legislative
procedural mechanisms, questioning whether a bill such as S.
1606 would be constitutional, how, if at all, it resolves the
difficulty of enforcement of judgments, whether it might provoke
retaliation by partners in trade, and, perhaps most significantly,
whether it constitutes a violation of U.S. trade treaty obligations.
Finally, Section V concludes that legislation designed to
remedy the defective system of suing foreign manufacturers
should be implemented as it would reduce litigation time and
expense considerably, easing the burden faced by American
consumers seeking redress. Furthermore, such legislation would
serve a fundamental domestic interest by protecting the health
and safety of American consumers: by alerting foreign
manufacturers that they would no longer be able to circumvent
the U.S. legal system, thereby escaping liability, the U.S.
government would likewise incentivize the same foreign
manufacturers to manufacture safer products in compliance with
U.S. health and safety regulations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A History of Injurious Defective Products
A significant factor in the issue at hand is the simple fact that
the United States manufactures only a fraction of the products
sold within the country. 8 The increasingly global marketplace and
outsourced manufacturing provides the U.S. with cheaper
products, but these items are often manufactured in countries
with minimal regulatory oversight. 9 Indeed, a "skyrocketing
number" of imported goods being sold in the American
marketplace hale from foreign countries and an alarming
percentage of these imports result in harm to American
7. See Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act, S. 1606, 111th
Cong. (2009).
8. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE: U.S. INT'L TRADE
IN GOODS AND SERVS.

(Sept. 2009), available at http:l/www.census.govlforeign-

trade/Press-Release/currentpressrelease/ft900.pdf.

9. See Kathleen Flynn Peterson, A Clear and Present Danger, 44 TRIAL

9, 9 (2008).
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consumers.1 0 Toys are among the most commonly defective items
in the American marketplace; they are often covered in lead paint,
contain deadly magnets, or are coated with substances akin to
date rape drugs."1 Naturally, this prevalence of unsafe toys in the
American market has given rise to panic among parents,
suppliers, and U.S. federal agencies charged with ensuring the
safety of products distributed in the country.
Problems with defective products are not limited to the
hazards of toys alone. Recent contaminations of many other
foreign-made products have wreaked havoc in the American
market as well. 12 Faulty and substandard toothpastes, pet foods,
pharmaceuticals, and malfunctioning high-risk medical devices
are examples of the hazards faced by the American consumer of
foreign products.13 The most recent and sensationalized example
of defective products causing harm to American consumers is the
10.

Hal Stratton, Chairman, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm.,

Testimony Submitted to the H. Appropriations Subcomm. on Transp.,
Treasury, and HUD, the Judiciary, DC 1 (Apr. 14, 2005) (according to the
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, deaths, injuries, and property
damage from consumer product incidents cost the U.S. more than $700
billion annually); see also Peterson, supranote 9 at 9 (noting that all twentyfour types of toys recalled for safety reasons from January to June 2007 were
manufactured overseas); see generally Chris Reidy, Reebok Recalls Bracelets
After Boy Dies, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 24, 2006, at C1 (in February of 2006, a
four-year-old boy in Minnesota died of lead poisoning after swallowing part of
a bracelet made by "a third-party, independent vendor in China" that was
99% lead).
11. See Peterson, supra note 9 at 9; Julia A. Phillips, Comment, Does
"Made in China Translate to 'Watch Out" For Consumers? The U.S.
CongressionalResponse to Consumer Product Safety Concerns, 27 PENN ST.
INT'L L. REV. 217, 217-19 (2008) (discussing dangerous product recalls such as
the 7.3 million Mattel, Inc. Polly Pocket dolls and accessories recalled
because they contained small magnets that could dislodge and be swallowed
or aspirated, causing injuries such as intestinal perforations, requiring
hospitalization for any number of days).
12. See Mark P. Chalos, Successfully Suing Foreign Manufacturers, 44
TRIAL 32, 32 (2008); see generally LucY P. ALLEN ET AL., NAT'L ECON.
RESEARCH Assoc., CHINA PRODUCT RECALLS: WHAT'S AT STAKE AND WHAT'S

NEXT, 14-15 (2008), available at http://www.nera.com/extImage/PUB-ChinaRecallsTrends_0609.pdf.
13. See Chalos, supra note 12, at 32; Rebecca Porter, FDA Faulted for
Oversight of Foreign Medical Device and Drug Makers, 44 AUG. TRIAL 16, 17
(2008) [hereinafter Porter, FDA Oversights]; Elizabeth Weise & Julie Schmit,
Pet Food Recall Spreads, and So Does Confusion, USA TODAY, Apr. 2, 2007, at
5D, available at http://www.usatoday.com/ news/nation2007-04-01-pet-foodrecall_N.htm.
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influx of faulty Chinese drywall, which was used abundantly at
the height of the U.S. housing boom, when building materials
were in short supply.14 Since then, "the walls literally began to
come down," and complaints of nosebleeds, headaches, itchy eyes
and skin, difficulty breathing, sinus infections, and asthma
attacks abound.15 As a result, the Consumer Product Safety
Commission has received more than 180 reports of health
problems or metal corrosion problems related to Chinese
drywall.16 After the onset of this unsettling epidemic, at least
fifteen class actions were filed in Florida, with others in Alabama,
California, and Louisiana, and individual suits have been brought
as well.17
Clearly, the U.S. faces a multitude of issues in the realm of
defective foreign products, and odds are greater than ever that
products sold in the U.S. - from cars, aircrafts, and component
parts to household products, jewelry, and toys - were actually
designed and manufactured on foreign soil.' 8
B. ProceduralHurdles U.S. Plaintiffs Struggle to Overcome
This wave of defective foreign products that has struck the
U.S. in recent years has proven that action must be taken to

14. See THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Chinese Drywall Poses Potential Risks,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30169267/ (noting that American
construction companies used millions of pounds of Chinese-made drywall
because it was abundant and cheap); see also Christopher J. Belter & Joseph
M. Hanna, What Lies Beneath: The Gathering Storm of Chinese Drywall
Defect Claims, FOR THE DEF. June, 2009, at 36-40 (discussing the growing
drywall problem, the resulting litigation, and the legislative acknowledgment
of the issues).
15. See Porter, Chinese Drywall MDL, supra note 4, at 64; see also Ashby
Jones, Does the New Product-LiabilityBoom Lie.. .Inside the Walls?, WALL ST.
J. L. BLOG (Apr. 17, 2009, 6:24 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/04/17/doesthe-new-product-liability-boom-lie-inside-the-walls/.
16. Porter, Chinese Drywall MDL, supra note 4, at 64.
17. See id. Currently, there are a number of actions pending; the U.S.
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all the federal drywall
cases to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and
consolidated them for pretrial proceedings. See In re Chinese-Manufactured
Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2047 (J.P.M.L. June 15, 2009)). See
also Allen v. Knauf Plasterboard Tianjin Co., No. 2:09 CV00054 (M.D. Fla.)
(filed Jan. 30, 2009).
18. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra
note 8.
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protect U.S. consumers. 19 The current globalized economy, with
its "fast travel and communications," paves the way for numerous
disputes between parties from different countries; these disputes
have increased steadily in recent years, and will certainly
continue to do so.20 In most circumstances, harmed consumers
face daunting challenges in seeking legal redress against foreign
manufacturers because of the difficulty of suing in foreign
countries and the unwillingness of foreign courts to enforce U.S.
court judgments. 2 1 More specifically, the procedural barriers
faced by U.S. plaintiffs when seeking to hold foreign
manufacturers accountable include: difficulty obtaining valid
personal jurisdiction, the complexities of serving process or notice
to the defendant, and the often near-impossibility of enforcing
U.S. judgments abroad. 22 These hurdles, combined with the many
different approaches used in legal systems abroad, invariably

19. Note that a number of legislative measures have been pursued
against specific products and their recalls, such as those tort bills aimed at
particular instances of defective products. See, e.g., Drywall Safety Act of
2009, H.R. 1977, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing action to prevent further use
of defective drywall, having been sparked by the recent outbreak of
contaminated drywall).
20.

INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: DEFENDING AND SUING FOREIGN PARTIES IN

U.S. FEDERAL COURTS 1 (David J. Levy ed., ABA Tort Trial and Ins. Practice
Section 2003) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION] (describing the
frequency and regularity of litigation in the courts of the U.S. against people
and entities from other countries).
21. See Adam Feeney, Comment, In Search of a Remedy. Do State Laws
Exempting Sellers from Strict Product Liability Adequately Protect
Consumers Harmed by Defective Chinese-Manufactured Products?, 34 J.
CORP. L. 567, 576 (2009) (asserting that ascertaining the location or address
of foreign manufacturers is often a problem, and even after determining the
location, company records are often incomplete and the manufacturer's level
of cooperation in complying with the lawsuit is low).
22. See generally 4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1067.1, 1069 (3d ed. 2010). A party suing in a
U.S. court must first be able to find a court that has Constitutional power
authority over the defendant, or "personal jurisdiction"; after filing, the party
must then inform the defendant of the lawsuit and its contents, meaning
summons and complaint must be properly served; at the end of the lawsuit,
the party must be able to collect any money awarded, especially when the
defendant's assets are outside of the U.S. See Jennifer Haltom Doan & Darby
V. Doan, Satisfying Due Process in Obtaining Jurisdiction over the Foreign
Component PartManufacturer, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 145, 146 (2009). See also
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 263-64 (1958)(Douglas, J., dissenting);
Chalos, supra note 12, at 33.
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cause U.S. consumers to face extraordinary difficulties and
complications when suing in U.S. courts and enforcing U.S.
judgments abroad-more difficulty than many foreign consumers
23
face in the reverse situation.
1. PersonalJurisdiction
A court's determination of whether it can assert personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, including a non-U.S.
defendant, is a complex, case-specific analysis with a long and
confused history. 24 In short, personal jurisdiction represents the
ability of a court to hear a dispute and to render a valid judgment
that will be recognized by other courts. 2 5 Thus, proper exercise of
personal jurisdiction is vital to both litigation and enforcement of
26
judgments, domestically and abroad.
American courts have struggled to define the limits of
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants. In fact, "[u]ntil the
mid-20th century, the widely held view was that a court's
jurisdiction extended no further than to the boundaries of the
state's territory."27 As international commerce expanded and
industry increased world-wide, U.S. courts attempted to develop a
more expansive concept of personal jurisdiction, which ultimately
yielded only "vague concepts labeled with precise-sounding
names." 28 As a result, an analysis of whether jurisdiction will be

23. Leveling the Playing Field and ProtectingAmericans: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. On Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. On the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Professor Louise Ellen Teitz,
Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law) [hereinafter
Teitz, Leveling the PlayingField].
24. See generally 18 Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §
8640.10 (2009). See also Linda Sandstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits of
Specific Personal Jurisdiction, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1619, 1620 (2001);
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 20, at 1, 2.
25. See Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 609-10
(1990) (determining additionally that a court that exercises personal
jurisdiction over a defendant in the absence of a proper jurisdictional basis
has violated that defendant's constitutional due process right, and therefore
any subsequent judgment is invalid).
26. See Teitz, Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 23 ("When the
defendant is an alien, there is the additional concern with potential
enforcement in foreign locations where the defendant has assets.").
27. Chalos, supra note 12, at 33; see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877),
overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
28. See Intl. Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (setting forth the
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proper, regardless of whether the defendant is a foreign individual
or entity, begins with two components: fairness and minimum
contacts.

29

Personal jurisdiction in the U.S. is governed by both the Due
Process Clause, generally under the Fourteenth Amendment in
state and federal court (when based on diversity jurisdiction), and
the laws of the forum state. 30
Beginning in 1945 with
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Supreme Court
determined that the Due Process Clause deems personal
jurisdiction proper when a nonresident defendant has "certain
minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."'3 1 Since this decision, subsequent cases have
demonstrated that contacts must include purposeful availment of
the privileges of the forum, and such purposeful availment arises
when the contacts result from the actions of the defendant,
creating a substantial connection with the forum, or where the
defendant's efforts are "purposefully directed" at that forum. 3 2
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, the Court was
unable to agree what set of circumstances should reasonably put a
defendant on notice that it would be subject to a forum state's

"minimum contacts" test); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)
(holding that, to warrant an exercise of personal jurisdiction, the Constitution
requires "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State"); Chalos, supra note
12, at 33.
29. See INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 20, at 114, 122-23.
30. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 289-91
(1980) (determining that Oklahoma's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a
New York car dealership under its "long-arm" statute was impermissible on
due process grounds).
31. See 326 U.S. at 316. See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S.
at 297 (citing Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316) (holding that a court may,
under the Fourteenth Amendment, exercise personal jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant only when the defendant's contacts with the forum state
are sufficient for the defendant to reasonably predict that it would be subject
to the forum state's jurisdiction); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940);
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION, supranote 20, at 1, 2.
32. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985);
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (1958). See also Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319
(determining that personal jurisdiction will depend on the quality and nature
of the activity in relation to the fair administration of the law).
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jurisdiction. 33 Although the Court broke the requirements down
into two distinct parts-the defendant's purposeful minimum
contacts with the forum and the fairness to the defendant in
having to be subject to jurisdiction in the forum-the Court did
not produce a majority opinion on the issue of whether a "streamof-commerce theory" (the theory that a defendant should
reasonably expect that placing a product into the stream of
commerce could cause it to end up in the forum state) was, on its
own, sufficient to support personal jurisdiction. 34 Today, there
remains a great deal of ambiguity with regard to the proper
exercise of personal jurisdiction, and the Court has not further
clarified this issue. With state and federal courts of appeals
applying varying standards in their determination of what
contacts with the forum state are sufficient to support a court's
assertion of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, it
is incredibly challenging to accurately predict whether a court will
assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
When Justice O'Connor wrote for the Asahi majority that,
"[clonsidering the international context, the heavy burden on the
alien defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the
forum State, the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a California
court over Asahi in this instance would be unreasonable and
unfair," the practical effect of this language was essentially to
encourage foreign manufacturers to challenge the assertion of
personal jurisdiction as a default response to suits against them. 35
33. See 480 U.S. 102, 122 (1987).

Asahi, a component part valve

manufacturer, sold valves to Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co. in Taiwan.
Id. at 106. Cheng Shin then used the valves in tires that it exported to the
U.S. The Court held that Asahi did not have sufficient contacts with
California (where a defective tire caused injury) for the district court to assert
personal jurisdiction over it. Id. at 106, 108.
34. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108-21. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
required that there must be some action "purposefully directed" towards the
forum state to support personal jurisdiction, even if Asahi had reason to
believe that its product would end up in California. Id. at 112. Meanwhile,
Justice Brennan's concurrence maintained that the fact that the injurycausing product had a foreseeable path from the manufacturer to the retailer
on its own was sufficient to support personal jurisdiction. Id. at 117
(Brennan, J., concurring). Thus, the stream-of-commerce debate remains
unresolved, and several circuits still allow district courts to assert
jurisdiction based upon stream-of-commerce theories alone.

35. Id. atll6; Teitz, Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 23. See also
supra note 20, at 1, 122 (noting that "[s]pecial

INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION,
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It is an inescapable truth that foreign defendants habitually claim
that they have not acted purposefully toward the forum state even
though they have derived significant profits from sales in that
state and others, and "the availability of this defense amply
demonstrates that our system of justice has not changed to match
the vast changes in our system of commerce." 3 6 Ultimately, as an
burdens are imposed on foreign defendants defending law suits in the United
States and therefore the courts must assess the fairness of asserting
jurisdiction over foreign defendants"; and also asserting that "the fact that a
defendant corporation is headquartered in a foreign country will militate
against a finding that jurisdiction is fair").
36. Gowen, Leveling the Playing Field,supra note 1.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey is presently considering a case in
which a British manufacturer of large scrap shears for use in the
scrap industry is claiming that it intended only to sell its products in
the United States--not in New Jersey. Every time we allow this
argument we allow these manufacturers to foist a fiction upon our
courts. A company cannot design, manufacturer or sell a product
into the American market without selling it into one of the fifty
states or the District of Columbia. In the New Jersey case the
foreign manufacturer attended industry trade shows in Las Vegas
and had an exclusive national distributor located in Ohio but is
resisting jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts where its product
caused serious injury based on the fiction that it was selling only to
the American market not to the market in one of the states. Justice
Brennan more accurately understood the nature of commerce in
foreign products in this country when he said that the stream of
commerce refers not to unpredictable eddies but to the regular and
anticipated flow of product from manufacturer to consumer in any of
the fifty states when it is sold into the American market.
See id. Gowen is referencing J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro; at the time
this Comment went to press, the Supreme Court of the United States has
granted certiorari to consider the issues presented in that dispute. See J.
McIntyre Machiner v. Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 62 (2010). The procedural posture
of that case is as follows: the trial court dismissed the case for lack of
personal jurisdiction after determining that there was no basis for the foreign
company to expect that its products would be sold in New Jersey. Nicastro v.
McIntyre Machinery, 399 N.J. Super 539, 45 A2d 92 (App. Div. 2008). On
appeal, New Jersey's intermediate appellate court reversed, holding that
jurisdiction was proper because J.McIntyre does business in the U.S. through
a single distributor, meaning that the foreign company could have expected
the products to end up anywhere in the U.S., including New Jersey. Id. The
New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately affirmed that decision, reasoning that
even if it lacked specific contacts with New Jersey, J.McIntyre had "targeted"
the entire U.S. Nicastro v. McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd., 201 N.J. 48
(2010). J McIntyre filed a petition for certiorari, which the Court granted on
Sept. 28, 2010. Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 62. Notably, this is the Court's first
reconsideration of these issues since it skirted them in Asahi. thus this case
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unfortunate consequence of this confusion, the now-routine
challenge of jurisdiction by foreign parties, and the fact-specific
nature of contacts, purposeful availment, and fairness to the
foreign defendant, cases involving foreign manufacturers generate
exceptionally expensive and time-consuming litigation over the
complexity and varying degrees of these aforementioned issues. 37
2. Service of Process
Another aspect of constitutionally mandated due process
requires a method of meaningful notice "reasonably calculated
under the circumstances" to provide notice of the litigation and an
opportunity to be heard. 38 In other words, the defendant must be
given proper notice and an opportunity to appear in the lawsuit,
and therefore the means and procedure for effecting service of
could be a vehicle for significant change.
37. Importantly, Justice O'Connor noted that the Court in Asahi had "no
occasion to determine whether Congress could, consistent with the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal
jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts
rather than on the contacts between the defendant and the State in which
the federal court sits." See 480 U.S. at 113 n.*. Likewise, this Comment does
not address national aggregation of contacts, as per Federal Rule 4(k)(2),
which would only apply to federal court matters. "Rule 4(k)(2), applicable
only to federal question cases, provides a federal long-arm statute as a
fallback for instances in which a [foreign] defendant is not subject to any
state's long-arm but the exercise of jurisdiction would be consistent with the
Constitution." Louise Ellen Teitz, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 39 (1996 &
Supp. 1999) [hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION]. This bill would impact
courts on both the federal and state level because the approach is not through
federal court rules, but rather through legislation.
38. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (reasoning that
"adequacy so far as due process is concerned is dependent on whether or not
the form of substituted service provided for such cases and employed is
reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and an
opportunity to be heard. If it is, the traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice a implicit in due process are satisfied"). See also Teitz,
Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 23. While compliance with the U.S.
rules for service is necessary to obtain valid jurisdiction in the U.S., foreign
law must also be observed, "especially if there is the potential because the
defendant has insufficient assets in the US of seeking subsequent
enforcement of any judgment outside of the U.S., either in the country in
which service is made, or another country"; as such, validity of service
involves "both looking backward to obtaining valid jurisdiction and forward to
achieving enforcement of any subsequent judgment." In addition, service in
the foreign country must conform with that foreign law as some countries
sanction violations of their sovereignty by criminal or civil penalties. Id.
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process on a foreign defendant will vary depending on the forum
and on the defendant's home country. 3 9 "A failure of notice means
a failure of due process," which may subject the suit to dismissal,
or may even prevent any award or judgment from being enforced
abroad. 4 0 Thus, much like personal jurisdiction, this procedural
issue can prove to be a cumbersome, costly, and time-consuming
41
process that delays legal redress for the aggrieved consumer.
Service of process is the traditional method of assuring notice to
defendants, but when foreign defendants are involved, technical
42
requirements can prove fatal to successful service.
Specific treaties, statutes and rules govern the methods for
serving process in foreign countries. If the defendant's home
country is one with which the U.S. has an applicable treaty, that
treaty controls, both in federal and state court, and it may or may
not be the exclusive vehicle for service. 4 3 The Hague Convention
on the Service of Process Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters ("Hague
Convention") is the exclusive means of serving a defendant in a
44 If
member country, as will soon be discussed in greater detail.

39. See FED. R. CIv. P. 4(f) advisory committee's note ("[gliven the
substantial increase in the number of international transactions and events
that are the subject of litigation in federal courts," service of proves in foreign
countries needed to be facilitated); Chalos, supranote 12, at 32.
40. Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction

Over and Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39

HASTINGS

L.J. 799, 834 (1988).
41. For example, Thomas L. Gowen testified at the hearing supporting
the proposition of legislation to correct these procedural hurdles that it took
"approximately three months to obtain service on a large corporation in
Buenos Aires, Argentina, after the complaint was directed to the central
authority there for service after compliance with all of the requirements of
the Hague Convention." See Gowen, Leveling the Playing Field,supra note 1.
42. See Degnan, supra, note 40, at 834.
43. See TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 37, at 133.
44. See 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638 [hereinafter "Hague
Convention"] (ratified by the U.S. in 1969); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h), 4(h)(2), and
4(f); INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 20, at 9-10 (noting that service
abroad under the Hague Service Convention supersedes the requirements of
Rule 4 and applicable state rules). The Hague Service Convention can be
found at 20 U.S.T. 361, reprinted immediately after Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, 28
U.S.C.A. Rule 4 (West Supp. 2002).
"In contrast, the Inter-American
Convention on Letters Rogatory, to which Mexico subscribes, does not
preempt other means of service." TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 37,
at 133. Significantly, what is "crucial for triggering The Hague Service
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no treaty controls, there are several options both under Rule 4 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and also under state
procedures, but there are a number of limitations on service

45
imposed by the foreign country where service is sought.
Many of the U.S.'s top trading partners are parties to the
Hague Convention, and thus the implications of service under this
treaty are weighty. 46 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(1) gives
deference to the form of service prescribed by treaties, so when a
matter falls within the scope of the Hague Convention, service
must be made "strictly according to its guidelines," for where Rule

4(f) conflicts with the Hague Convention, the Convention must
47
prevail.
The Hague Convention was drafted to accomplish three
primary objectives: "to simplify the methods of serving in the
territory of one state documents issued by the courts of another,"
"to establish a system for service that best would ensure that the
person served received actual notice in time to respond to pending
litigation," and to create a means by which proof of service abroad
To meet these aims, the drafters
easily could be made. 4 8

Convention, in federal or state court, is that service is effected abroad ('where
there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service
abroad')." Teitz, Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 23; see generally
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION,

supra note 37, at 131-55.

45. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f). In federal cases, Rule 4 governs service of
process, and under this rule, service on foreign defendants is permitted
pursuant to the Hague Service Convention or any other applicable treaty. If
there is no governing treaty, service may be made: according to the law of
the foreign country in which service of process is being attempted; as directed
by a foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory, which is a written
request issued by a court filing an action that asks the appropriate foreign
authority for assistance in serving documents on one of its citizens, or a letter
of request; by signed-receipt mail delivery sent by the clerk of the court;
pursuant to any court-ordered means not prohibited by international
agreement. See also Marcantonio v. Primorsk Shipping Corp., 206 F. Supp.
2d 54, 58 (D. Mass. 2002) (determining that the "country in which service is
being made is the country whose laws must be obeyed, not the country of
origin of the person or corporation being served"). See also TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION,

supra note 37, at 131-55.

46. Hague Conference on Private International Law, table, available at
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=41; U.S.
CENSUS BuREAu, supra note 8.
47. Chilean Nitrate Corp. v. M.V. Hans Leonhardt, 810 F. Supp. 732, 734
(E.D. La. 1992); INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 20, at 5.
48. Degnan, supra note 40, at 837.
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developed a basic system for service while also allowing for the
use of several alternative methods, "as long as the state in which
service is made does not object to the particular method
utilized." 49
The Convention sets up a governmental "Central Authority"
in each signatory state that is responsible for executing requests
from abroad for service of judicial documents; some countries do
not object to the use of direct mail and other means of service,
such as under Rule 4.50 However, there are alternative methods
for effecting service under the treaty-unless the receiving state
has objected to the alternative methods-and among those
specifically mentioned alternatives are the freedom to send
judicial documents by postal channels directly to the person to be
served and the freedom of any person interested in the litigation
to effect service through the judicial officers, officials, or
competent persons of the receiving state. 5 1
While these
alternatives are often feasible, a number of signatory states have
objected to one or more of them, so that "an American lawyer
attempting to serve process under the Convention must read
52
carefully the objections filed by the receiving state."

49. Id.
50. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4; INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 20, at 12;
Degnan, supra note 40, at 837. "In the United States, the Central Authority
is the Department of Justice. The Department does not facilitate service of
American process abroad; American litigants must deliver their documents
directly to the foreign Central Authority." Id. at 837 n. 183.
The person serving process in the sending state must send to the
Central Authority of the receiving state two copies of a 'request,'
which conform to the model annexed to the Convention, as well as
the original and a copy of the documents to be served. If the request
does not comply with the requirements, the Central Authority will
inform the sender of its objections and will not complete service until
the defects are remedied. If the request is in compliance, the
Authority will arrange to have service accomplished by a method
consistent with that country's internal law, or by a method
requested, if that method comports with the internal law. Once
service is effected, the Authority returns a certificate to the sender
stating that service has been accomplished, the method used to do
so, the date it was completed, and the person to whom process was
delivered.
Id. at 837-38.
51. See Hague Convention art. 10, supra note 44; Degnan, supra note 40,
at 838.
52. See Degnan, supra note 40, at 838 (citing Lemme v. Wine of Japan
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Thus the use of this Authority adds not only costs, as most
lawyers use a private company to prepare the documents, but also
delay because these documents must be delivered to the foreign
Central Authority to be served domestically, after which the
Authority returns proof of service. 53 Aside from this frustrating
delay of service due to the mandated use of a Central Authority,
the Hague Convention also generally requires that documents be
translated into the relevant foreign language, which poses another
added expense and considerable delay. 54 To complicate matters
further, the Hague Convention does not include a time
requirement in which the foreign authorities must attempt
service, resulting in additional confusion, delay, and expense.55
For these reasons, service is an area of significant expense and
delay for harmed American consumers seeking to hold foreign
manufacturers accountable.
The importance of the Hague Convention with regard to
service of process culminates in a strict bottom line: failure to

comply with the Convention voids the attempted service. 56 When
service is invalid, the summons will be quashed or, more
Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (Japan objects to personal
service, but not delivery through mail); Harris v. Browning-Ferris Indus.
Chem. Servs., Inc., 100 F.R.D. 775, 777 (M.D. La. 1984) (Germany objects to
mail service); Kadota v. Hosogai, 125 Ariz. 131, 135-36 (Ct. App. 1980) (Japan
objects to personal service)).
53. See Teitz, Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 23. Additionally,
Teitz's testimony included a note regarding the recent Hague Conference
Special Commission on the Service Convention: there, "many countries were
trying to complete service within three months, but many others, including
China, indicated that adopting guidelines requiring service within three
months was not feasible."
54. See Chalos, supra note 12, at 34 (explaining that "Article 5 of the
Hague Service Convention requires that, unless specifically waived by the
receiving country, documents must be translated into the receiving country's
language" and "[t]ranslating complex legal documents can cost several
thousand dollars and take weeks to complete"); see also INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION, supra note 20, at 18.

55. See Chalos, supra note 12, at 34 (noting also that Article 15 of the
Convention "presents significant hurdles to obtaining a default judgment if
service through the authorities stalls").
56. See INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 20, at 5 n.14 (noting that
where a country is a party to the Convention, "the Convention's procedures
are the exclusive means by which service of process may be effected in that
country." (emphasis added)). Note that defendants may waive service, in
which case the issue becomes significant at the close of the suit with regard
to enforcement.
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dramatically, the suit will be dismissed, leaving the injured
plaintiff to either attempt service once more, or accept defeat by
procedural minutiae. 5 7
3. Enforcement

The final area in which U.S. parties suing foreign
manufacturers face seemingly insurmountable hurdles is
enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad, for the foreign defendant
often will have no assets in this country against which to enforce a
judgment. Although the U.S. is not a party to any bilateral or
multilateral agreements for the enforcement of civil judgmentsmeaning that a foreign country is under no legal obligation to
recognize a U.S. civil judgment- the U.S. generally recognizes
and enforces foreign judgments domestically. 58 Foreign countries
are reluctant to enforce U.S. judgments for many reasons, such as
hostility towards the jury system and towards compensatory
awards that include significant amounts for pain and suffering or
punitive damages; at any rate, when a U.S. judgment is in fact
recognized by a foreign court, even then the process may prove
lengthy and costly, requiring relitigation of many issues. 59
57. See TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 37, at 135.
Note,
however, that often compliance with the Convention's process is not required
if the state and federal courts interpret the service as completed within the
U.S. In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, the Supreme Court of
the United States upheld service that did not comply with the Convention
since service was effected in the U.S., rather than abroad. See 486 U.S. 694,
700 (1988); TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 37, at 137.
58. See Teitz, Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 23. ("The reality is
that we have a trade imbalance, in that we import and enforce most incoming
foreign judgments far more often than we are able to export and enforce our
judgments overseas. "American plaintiffs who can find a foreign defendant's
assets in this country can of course enforce a judgment from one state in a
sister state under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and use expedited
procedures under uniform state law.") See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
59. See Teitz, Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 23 (noting
additionally that when service was not made in accordance with an
applicable treaty or when the U.S. basis for personal jurisdiction is not
recognized by the foreign country, the resulting judgment will not be
recognized); see also Donald C. Clarke, The Enforcement of United States
Court Judgments in China: A Research Note (George Wash. Univ. Law Sch.
Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper, Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 236, 2004), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
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C. DisadvantagedU.S. Consumers and Manufacturers
These procedural barriers result in disadvantage to U.S.
consumers and U.S. manufacturers and distributors alike. The
system creates a clear competitive advantage for foreign
manufacturers as U.S. manufacturers can be sued far more easily
under the current system, and any judgments rendered against
these domestic manufacturers will certainly be enforced
nationwide under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 60 Moreover,
this means that some foreign-based companies circumvent the
costs of compliance with the U.S. system of regulating products,
and thus foreign manufacturers are able to reduce their prices
accordingly. 61 "This places those companies who are subject to the
full effects of the U.S. legal system at a competitive disadvantage
62
because their competitors are avoiding this 'tort tax."'

Furthermore, these procedural hurdles often lead injured
consumers to seek redress elsewhere. Indeed, when a plaintiff
cannot obtain proper personal jurisdiction over a foreign
manufacturer, the plaintiff will likely sue the easier target: the
U.S. retailer, who will in turn struggle to recover from its own
insurer, as well as the foreign manufacturer of the defective and
injurious product.
Because of the extensive delays that
compliance with the Hague Service Convention often necessitates,
namely those based on the requirement of translating documents
into a relevant language and service through a Central Authority,
a U.S. plaintiff considering suing a foreign as opposed to a
domestic defendant will undoubtedly "save time and money by
suing the U.S. defendant." 63
In addition, a U.S. plaintiff

id =943922. For example, researchers have not found any instance where a
Chinese court has enforced a U.S. judgment without first relitigating the
issues of the case. Id. In fact, in almost no modern cases have Chinese
courts enforced the judgments of foreign courts without relitigating the case
on the merits. Id. at 3-4. Furthermore, Chinese courts have, in several cases,
refused to enforce the judgments of foreign courts. Id. at 4.
60. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
61. See Leveling the Playing Field and Protecting Americans: Hearing
Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. On Admin. Oversight and the
Courts, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Victor E. Schwartz, Esq., Partner,

Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, on behalf of the U.S. Chamber Institute for
Legal Reform and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
62. Id.
63. Teitz, Leveling the PlayingField,supra note 23.
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considering potential defendants would be "well-advised to sue
any domestic defendant with potential substantive liability or to
make sure the potential foreign defendant has assets in the U.S.
or at least debtors to it in the U.S."64 As a result of these delays
and expenses associated with serving foreign manufacturers with
a lawsuit and establishing jurisdiction over these foreign
defendants, manufacturers are inevitably at a competitive
disadvantage as foreign companies are able to offer less expensive
products that do not comply with U.S. safety requirements.
These examples demonstrate several reasons why U.S.
plaintiffs would forgo the difficulties of pursuing redress from
foreign manufacturers in favor of simply turning on the U.S.
supplier, distributor, or any other U.S. company within the chain
of supply. In fact, lawyers sometimes even encourage injured
plaintiffs to take aim at the easiest targets rather than facing the
prohibitively expensive and time and resource-consuming
measures. 6 5 For instance, plaintiffs may be advised that although
the foreign manufacturer bears "the ultimate moral responsibility
for problems with their products, under most states' laws,
domestic actors have legal obligations not to market and sell
dangerous or defective products, regardless of their manufacturing
origin" thus, with the procedural challenges that arise in litigation
against foreign defendants, "successfully getting redress for a
66
person injured by a foreign product often begins at home."
This guidance is not misplaced: it is undoubtedly true that it
would be far simpler to obtain personal jurisdiction, complete
service of process, and enforce any subsequent judgments when
the defendant is a U.S. company. However, the cost of this
strategy can be substantial. With the implementation of these
tactics, foreign manufacturers will often escape liability
unscathed, leaving U.S. companies to bear the brunt, if not the
entirety, of their liability.

64. Id.
65. See Chalos, supra note 12, at 37 ("Counsel should keep in mind that
when a product that has been manufactured abroad causes injury in the
United States, domestic parties may be culpable, too.").
66. Id.
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III. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS

Leaving U.S. consumers with little recourse other than to
pursue redress from domestic companies, and protecting foreign
manufacturers with the aforementioned procedural barriers, the
current system is certainly flawed. The problem is not a new one;
past efforts to legislate around these barriers have fallen short,
but proponents of these attempted measures continue to pursue
67
legislative means to a fair and accountable end.
A.

The ForeignManufacturersAccountability Bill: The Proposal
and The Facts
The Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Bill S. 1606
was introduced into the United States Senate on August 6, 2009.68
This bipartisan legislation is aimed at reducing the legal hurdles
facing Americans injured by products manufactured outside the
U.S., as discussed above. 69 Senators Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.),
Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) and Richard Durbin (D-Ill.) introduced the
Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2009 ("the

Act") to bring foreign manufacturers within the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts. 7 0

The

Act

would

cover

Consumer

Product

Safety

67. In response to the reality that foreign manufacturers who
"enthusiastically seek to enter the U.S. market do not have the same
accountability as domestic manufacturers," Linda Sanchez (D-Cal.)
introduced the Protecting Americans from Unsafe Foreign Products Act (H.R.
5913) in the House on May 1, 2008. If passed, the law would have allowed
service of process on foreign manufacturers where they reside, are found,
have an agent, or transact business. See Porter, FDA Oversights, supra note
13, at 60. The bill would have allowed "American consumers harmed by
foreign defective products to obtain personal jurisdiction by serving foreign
manufacturers with process where they reside, are found, have an agent or
transact business" and "would also help eliminate the unfair competitive
advantage enjoyed by foreign manufacturers and ensure that they can be
held accountable in U.S. courts for injuries consumers suffer as a result of
defective products." Protecting Americans from Unsafe ProductsAct: Hearing
on H.R. 5913 Before the H. Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6 (2008)
(statement of Linda T. Sanchez, Chairwoman of the H. Judiciary Subcomm.
on
Commercial
and
Administrative
Law),
available
at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th / 4 2 1 19 .pdf.
68. See S. 1606 111th Cong. (2009); A Weekly Review of U.S. Trade Policy
Developments, THE WASHINGTON MONITOR (Winston & Strawn L.L.P.,
Washington, D.C.), Vol. 13 Issue 33, Aug. 18, 2009, at 2.
69. S. 1606; see also discussion supra, pp. 7-15.
70. S. 1606.
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Commission-regulated products such as children's toys, Food and
Drug Administration-regulated products such as prescription
drugs and medical devices, and Environmental Protection Agencyregulated products, including pesticides. 7 1
In support of the bill, Senator Whitehouse commented on the
shocking number of recent examples of U.S. consumers injured by
foreign products, noting that "American [businesses and
consumers] harmed by defective foreign products need justice, and
they do not get it when foreign manufacturers use technical legal
defenses to avoid [compensating those] they have injured."72 The
Act would lower the two procedural hurdles to bringing suit
against foreign manufacturers in the U.S., firstly by simplifying
service of process, requiring every manufacturer to have an
"agent" located in at least one state where the manufacturer does
business that would accept service of process for all civil and
regulatory claims, and secondly by subjecting the manufacturer to
the jurisdiction of state and federal courts in the U.S., where it
might previously have been beyond such jurisdiction. 7 3 As
written, S. 1606 requires manufacturers seeking to export to the
U.S. to designate a registered agent in the U.S. that is authorized
to accept service of process on behalf of the manufacturer. It also
requires foreign manufacturers that seek to import products
covered by consumer protection and safety regulations to
acknowledge their consent to jurisdiction in the state in which the
registered agent is located. 7 4 Clearly, this bill is meant to reduce
71. Id. at §4.
72. Leveling the Playing Field and ProtectingAmericans: HearingBefore
the Sen. Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. On Admin. Oversight and the Courts,
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, United States
Senator for the State of Rhode Island) [hereinafter Whitehouse, Leveling the
Playing Field]. Testimony at the hearing given to recount a number of
instances in the past few years where foreign-made products injured
Americans included discussion of the lead-tainted children's charm bracelet
that claimed a four year-old's life in 2006, the contaminated blood thinner
that contributed to many deaths in 2008, and the defective drywall imported
from China.
73. See S. 1606. The goal is to replace the "cumbersome" procedural
systems with a requirement that, within six months of the date of the Bill's
enactment, the head each relevant government agency shall "require foreign
manufacturers ... to establish a registered agent." See id.; Whitehouse,
Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 72.
74. See S. 1606. Also, as it stands, the bill would apply to manufacturers
of whole or component parts of specific products if those manufacturers
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the harm caused by defective products manufactured by foreign

entities and to protect the health and safety of American
consumers in the face of a wave of defective foreign products; its

aim is to ensure that all foreign products have an accountable
manufacturer present in a U.S. jurisdiction to facilitate any suits
that may be brought against those manufacturers if U.S. health
and safety requirements are not met.

B. The PurportedRole of the Act
The bill will reduce the amount of litigation involved in suits
against foreign manufacturers and therefore ease the burden on
judicial resources, the legal system, and ameliorate costs faced by
U.S. plaintiffs. 75 Although the Act is not without its critics, it is
currently enjoying strong bipartisan support as a carefully drafted
The Act and its
effort to correct the flaws in the system.
requirement of consent to jurisdiction and designation of an agent
for service for foreign manufacturers could "reduce the
uncertainty that plaintiffs face about if and where they can sue
and maintain jurisdiction within the U.S."76 Furthermore, S.

produce in excess of a minimum value or quantity of those products. The
specified products are drugs, devices, cosmetics, biological products,
consumer products, chemical substances and pesticides (as defined under
U.S. law), and the threshold level or quantity is to be established by the
relevant government agency regulating that product. See id.; see also
Whitehouse, Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 72. Note that S. 1606's
companion House bill, H.R. 4678 will seek to achieve similar ends. See H.R.
4678 111th Cong. (2010). Specifically, the bill would "require foreign
manufacturers of products imported into the United States to establish
registered agents in the United States who are authorized to accept service of
process against such manufacturers, and for other purposes." Id.
75. Consent is a traditional basis for personal jurisdiction; S. 1606
mandates consent by foreign manufacturers, thereby eliminating lengthy
litigation over the nature and extent of minimum contacts necessary for the
court to have authority over the defendant, as discussed above, in at least one
state. This, of course, is analogous to the procedure domestic manufacturers
are subjected to, as domestic manufacturers can always be sued either at the
principal place of business or in the state of incorporation.
76. See S. 1606; Teitz, Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 23.
"Although not on all fours, a recent case which involved a Swiss- made single
engine plane that was en route from Florida to Rhode Island and crashed in
Pennsylvania in connection with a planned stop there demonstrates the
difficulties that US plaintiffs may have in suing foreign manufacturers
without extended litigation in what would seem to be a reasonable forum, the
site of the crash, for a manufacturer where the majority of that model of the
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1606 would significantly change the law in jurisdictions that have
traditionally required purposeful availment, subjecting a foreign
manufacturer to suit in at least the state where it has established
its registered agent. 77 In short, foreign manufacturers whose
products are imported into the U.S. would no longer be able to
avoid litigation in the U.S. by restricting their business and
operations to foreign locations, or structuring their business
through layers of independent agents and distributors.
C. Current Status and Implicationsfor the Future

In light of the circumstances discussed above as well as the
legal struggle in which many U.S. consumers have found
themselves currently embroiled, both of which have given rise to
the proposal of legislation such as S. 1606, it is plain that some
action must be taken to provide procedural recourse that comports
At
with the evolving and expanding global marketplace. 78
present, the bill is being considered by the Finance Committee,
has reasonably strong bipartisan support as a popular remedy
within the Senate and the House, and is also supported by the
79
Consumers Union and the Consumer Federation of America.
For now, S. 1606 is far from becoming law as it has many
80
legislative stages and phases to pass before reaching that status.
plane 'ultimately are sold in the United States."' Id.
77. See S. 1606 §5.
78. See generally discussion supra pp. 4-5, 7-15 (noting the harm suffered
by American consumers and the procedural barriers that stand in the way of
their seeking of legal redress).
79. See THE WASHINGTON MONITOR, supra note 68 at 2. S. 1606 has been
read twice in the Senate and referred to the Finance Committee. It may then
return to the Senate floor for a vote. If the Bill passes the Senate it will need
to be passed in the House, which will involve referral to a House Committee,
and if passed in both House and Senate, it will need to be signed by the
President, who could choose to veto it. See id.
80. The bill is only the first step in the legislative process. Introduced
bills and resolutions first go to committees that deliberate, investigate, and
revise them before they go to general debate. The majority of bills and
resolutions never make it out of committee. Indeed, S. 1606 must pass before
the 1 1 1 t h Congressional Session comes to a close, otherwise it will need to be
reintroduced for further consideration. See GovTrack.us, S. 1606: Foreign
Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2009, "Overview," 11 1 th Cong.
http://www.govtrack.
legislation),
of
federal
(database
(2009)
us/congress/bill.xpd?biU=slll-1606 (last visited Oct. 6, 2010). "Information
on committee proceedings is notoriously opaque": the committees vary in the
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If passed, however, the bill will revolutionize the system and make
it easier, faster, and less expensive to sue foreign manufacturers,
some currently beyond the reach of U.S. courts.
IV. COMPLICATIONS AND PROBLEMATIC ISSUES WITH LEGISLATION
AIMING TO SURMOUNT PROCEDURAL HURDLES

Ostensibly, S. 1606 seems poised for success: it would
seemingly remedy the inability to hold foreign manufacturers
accountable for their defective products, thereby "leveling the
playing field" for U.S. consumers and manufacturers alike. Even
so, it is important to consider several issues raised by this
proposed legislation. Because no such legislation has been passed
at this time, it follows that it is indeed a genuine challenge to
draft a bill that is at once sufficiently remedial but does not
infringe on other substantive areas of law or inappropriately and
discriminatorily expand jurisdiction. S. 1606 and any similar
legislation must therefore be analyzed to determine whether it
survives a constitutional challenge, whether it might inspire
retaliation by U.S. trade partners, whether it is consistent with
U.S. treaty obligations, and whether it ameliorates the many
difficulties of enforcing judgments.
A. The ConstitutionalChallenge
Among the challenges that confront legislation such as S.
1606 are those of the constitutional variety. Past bills have
overreached the constitutional parameters of personal jurisdiction,
and thus the primary matter at issue in this constitutional
challenge is the requirement of valid personal jurisdiction. 8 1 S.
1606 would authorize jurisdiction over foreign defendants by
virtue of designation of an agent for service-which acknowledges
amount of information made public during the process, and they often do not
provide basic public information such as the results of votes electronically or
in an understandable format. See GovTrack.us, H.R. 5913: Protecting
Americans from Unsafe Foreign Products Act, "Committee Assignments,"
110th Cong. (2008) (database of federal legislation), http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=hllO-5913&tab=committees (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
81. Note, however, that past attempts at legislation were far more tortoriented, whereas this bill is entirely procedural. Thus, it is all the more
imperative that this legislation comports with the Constitution so as to
ensure the validity of U.S. courts exercising personal jurisdiction over these
foreign defendants.
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consent to the jurisdiction of the State in which the agent is
located-and conscious importing of products into the U.S.82 That
authorization arguably reaches beyond the bounds of the
constitutional principle that state courts can only establish
personal jurisdiction over defendants who purposefully establish
minimum contacts with that forum state.8 3
As an important threshold matter, it is necessary to note that
the protections of the U.S. Constitution extend to all defendants,
even foreign defendants. This principle, though never clearly
articulated by the Supreme Court, has been implicit for many
years. Foreign defendants do not have fewer rights to challenge
constitutionality of jurisdiction, for "[c]ountless cases assume that
foreign companies have all the rights of U.S. citizens to object to
extraterritorial assertions of personal jurisdiction."8 4 Moreover,
that assumption by so many courts "probably is too solidly
entrenched to be questioned at this late date."85

As such, the

applicability of the requirements of personal jurisdiction and
adequate notice to alien defendants "cannot be doubted since the
courts long have recognized that our due process guarantees are
available to 'persons' whether or not they are citizens of the
United States."8 6
With this principle in mind, legislation that seeks to make
foreign defendants more susceptible to suit in the U.S. must not
infringe upon the rights of these defendants. Legislation must be
carefully drafted to stay within the bounds of the Constitution.
The bill's requirement that a foreign manufacturer designate an
agent for service of process arguably contravenes these rights, but
it is at best an unconvincing argument. All that is required for
valid service of process is meaningful notice under federal or state
law: under S. 1606, meaningful notice would be served upon the
foreign manufacturer's chosen agent in whichever state that agent
82. See S. 1606.
83. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(determining that it is long-standing judicial precedent that state courts may
only assert personal jurisdiction over defendants who establish minimum
contacts with that forum state).
84. See Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358,
1362 (7th Cir. 1985).
85. Id.
86. Degnan, supra note 40, at 800 (citing Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522,
530 (1954)).
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resides.
An example of such proper service in action is
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, where the
Supreme Court upheld service that did not comply with the Hague
Convention since service was effected in the U.S., rather than
abroad. 8 7 Thus, the foreign manufacturer enjoys the same due
process requirements as domestic manufacturers, and no
constitutional right is violated.
The minimum contacts requirement might also be seen as
problematic because this legislation purports to eliminate that
aspect of litigation by designation of agents, which effectuates
consent to jurisdiction. Generally, minimum contacts or other
traditional forms of jurisdiction, such as domicile or consent, are
sufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant
to be valid.8 8 With regard to minimum contacts, however, Shaffer
v. Heitner held that the analysis set forth in InternationalShoe is,
unequivocally, the only analysis to conduct in assessing minimum
contacts, and this must comport with the Fourteenth Amendment
to constitute a valid exercise of personal jurisdiction.8 9
S. 1606 renders minimum contacts irrelevant. The bill would
make clear to foreign manufacturers that by importing their
products into the U.S. and by registering an agent in the U.S., as
would be required by this legislation, they are effectively
consenting to the jurisdiction of the courts in the one U.S. state
where their designated agent is located. Consenting to personal
jurisdiction in this manner is entirely permissible; the purpose of
personal jurisdiction is to protect a defendant's liberty interest,
and so it can be waived, which would be the practical effect of
consent in the situation S. 1606 envisions. 90 Therefore, by
87. See 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988).

There, Volkswagenwerk, a German

manufacturer, was served in a products liability case through Volkswagen of
America, its domestic subsidiary, under the state Illinois state law that
allows service on foreign corporations through service on agents, voluntary or
involuntary, located within the state. See also TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION,
supra note 37, at 137.
88. See TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 37, at 46-47, 53. "Consent
and waiver have long been recognized as forming the basis for personal
jurisdiction." See also Robert C. Casad, 1 JURISDICTION IN CML ACTIONS 13035 (2d ed. 1998).
89. 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (determining that "all assertions of statecourt jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
InternationalShoe and its progeny.").
90. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea,
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consenting to jurisdiction, the expensive litigation concerning
service and personal jurisdiction would be averted, leaving only
the merits of the suit to be settled.
Though the argument might be made that this disregard of a
minimum contacts assessment should render any exercise of
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants invalid, in fact, the
bill is consistent with constitutional requirements. The only way
to challenge the bill's proposed arrangement is to argue that
foreign manufacturers are not meaningfully consenting to
jurisdiction. However, it must be noted that these foreign
manufacturers do not enjoy an automatic right to the U.S.
marketplace, and thus the U.S. government is of course permitted
to set certain regulations and conditions.
Here, the bill's
mandates are both reasonable and fair: it is not discriminating
against foreign manufacturers, nor is it purporting to serve as a
blanket restriction on all products shipped to the U.S. Instead,
the bill regulates only those products that would be regulated by
the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Food and Drug Administration,
emphasizing the focus on incentivizing foreign manufacturers to
make products that comply with the same health and safety
regulations to which U.S. manufacturers must conform. 9 1 For this
reason, a constitutional challenge to the effectiveness of
designating an agent for service of process in the U.S.-and
thereby acknowledging consent to the jurisdiction of the State in
which the registered agent is located-proves weak and
unfounded.
B. RetaliatoryMeasures
Conceivably, legislation such as S. 1606 could prompt U.S.
trade partners to respond with similar legislation in their own
countries. Indeed, as Professor Louise Ellen Teitz cautioned at
the May 2009 hearing, there is the "strong possibility" that U.S.
456 U.S. 694, 703 (noting that because the personal jurisdiction requirement
can be waived, there are a "variety of legal arrangements" by which a litigant
may give "express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the
court").

91. See S. 1606. The issue of perceived discrimination against foreign
manufacturers is revisited and discussed in much greater detail infra, pp. 2932.
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trading partners will adopt legislation that "may make it harder
92
for U.S. manufacturers exporting their products overseas."
Many observers express similar sentiments.
Writers and
commentators share the concern that retaliation could be the
immediate, and even vengeful, reaction. "Does anyone honestly
think that our foreign trade partners are going to line up and sign
up for this one without any tit-for-tat that would require more
stringent product liability regulation and enforcement on
American exports?"9 3

Likewise, one writer warns that foreign

companies selling in China enjoy a "very nice products liability
climate" where the distributor is primarily liable, and "although
foreign companies do get sued here once in a while, by and large
they have little to fear." If the U.S. were to change its laws to
make it easier to sue Chinese exporters to the U.S., is it not likely
that "the Chinese government might think about tightening
things up"?9 4 The sarcastic response to this rhetorical question:
"[njah, Beijing never cares about reciprocity..."95
Surely this aspect of any legislation purporting to tailor the
system to more easily sue foreigners will not be overlooked.

However, as a practical matter, it seems unlikely that the passage
of legislation such as S. 1606 would inspire retaliation. The bill
merely changes the procedures for suing foreign defendants,

making no change to underlying substantive law. Moreover,
realistically, the U.S. exports far less to other countries than it
imports, meaning that other countries receive comparatively little

from the U.S.96 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
simple reality is that parties would prefer to sue in the U.S., not in
foreign countries.
A foreign country changing its laws or
procedures will not have significant bearing on U.S. practices. In
the unlikely event a foreign country did in fact modify its laws in a
retaliatory fashion, Constitutional due process would very likely
92. Teitz, Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 23.
93. See AbiK, Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act: Yeah,

right, LAWYERS AND SETTLEMENTS, http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/

blog/?s=foreign+manufacturers+legal+accountability (Aug. 13, 2009).
94. See Stan Abrams, U.S. Senate Goes After Foreign (esp. Chinese)
Manufacturers, CHINA HEARSAY, http://www.chinahearsay.com/us-senategoes-after-foreign-esp-chinese-manufacturers/ (Aug. 12, 2009).
95. Id.
96. See generally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
supra note 8.
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be violated and so the U.S. would refuse to enforce the judgment
of that foreign court.
C. Treaty Obligationsunder the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Another area of difficulty for legislation such as S. 1606 is in
the realm of international treaties and agreements. It is vital that
any new legislation comport with the many obligations the U.S. is
under as a result of being a party to a number of treaties, the most
basic and important of which is the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT"), discussed below. 9 7 Fundamentally, the U.S.
cannot create laws that effectively attempt to supersede or alter
its responsibilities and commitments under its treaty agreements;
the U.S. must honor its agreements in the international
marketplace and refrain from instituting non-tariff barriers to
trade." The economic approach to trade agreements begins with
the assumption that governments are motivated to pursue policies
that increase national income, although they sometimes are forced
to depart from that objective for political reasons."9 8 If the U.S.
breached any one of its treaties, naturally it would be in violation
of that treaty and would subsequently face retaliation,
international sanctions, and international scorn, at the very least.
1. The GATT: A Brief History
As the primary international and multilateral trade treaty to
which the U.S. is a party, the GATT is a central and essential
component of U.S. international trade policy. As a prelude to
understanding the significance of the role the GATT plays in the
world's market, it is important to note the treaty's historical
function. Today, "electronic data transmissions, instantaneous
business communications, and sophisticated service industries"
characterize the U.S. market, which has evolved dramatically in
recent decades. 99 Before the GATT came into being, trade

97.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-

ll, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. See discussion infra pp. 26-29.
98.

DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, & ALAN 0.

SYKES, THE

GENESIS OF THE GATT 177 (American Law Institute) (2008).

99.

See Ronald A. Brand, GATT and the Evolution of United States Trade

Law, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 101, 101-02 (1992).
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relations were generally handled on a bilateral basis, with
agreements being made between single foreign countries.100
These bilateral agreements certainly were of some importance to
trade relations among other countries, even though they were
negotiated on an individual basis; this "changed dramatically with
the advent of the GATT."101
During the early 1930s, when the world's leading trading
nations were deep in recession, they introduced a series of highly
protectionist measures which only further damaged international
trade.l0 2 In seeking to remedy poor international trade relations,
the U.S. and the UK began to discuss plans for a post-war system
of regulating world trade.103 Ultimately, the GATT arose from a
United States Department of State publication released in 1945
that included a "Proposal for Consideration by an International
Conference on Trade and Employment," and "[t]his document
formed the basis for the negotiation of a Charter for an
International Trade Organization" ("ITO").104 As negotiations
continued, "there developed a separate agreement to lock in
negotiated tariff reductions. This was the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade." 10 5 Pressed for time, the contracting parties
concluded the "provisional" GATT, with the understanding that
the ITO Charter ("Charter"), "once completed and ratified, would
provide the institutional framework for the administration of the
GATT."106 When efforts to adopt the Charter failed, the U.S. was
100. See id. at 102.
101. Id. (noting that a "multilateral framework in which to negotiate and
apply trade rules has been an important contribution to the development of
trade law throughout the world").
102. HAMMOND SUDDARDS SOLICITORS, THE ANATOMY SERIES OF INT'L
INSTITUTIONS, AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 1

(Konstantinos Adamantopoulos ed., Kluwer Law Int'l Ltd. 1997) [hereinafter
ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION].

103. Id.
104. Brand, GATT, supra note 99, at 117-18.
105. Id. at 118.
106. Id. at 118-19. However:
Once completed, the Charter suffered from congressional
Further
ambivalence toward international cooperation generally.
concerns were raised because the Charter (1) dealt not only with
trade, but also with the encouragement of fall employment and with
competition law matters, (2) may have been too legalistic for the
time, and (3) like the GATT, contained many exceptions to its trade
rules.
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left with the GATT, "an executive agreement that itself was never
ratified as a treaty by the United States," and was adopted
originally on a "provisional" basis.107 "It contained no detailed
provisions for a body to administer what rules it did contain," and
"provided only vague provisions on the resolution of disputes." 10 8
Today, the GATT is at once the Agreement itself, with its
rules for international trade, and also "the organization that has
grown up to fill the void left by the absence of the ITO."109 As
such, the GATT "provides a legal framework for the conduct of
trade relations, a forum for trade negotiations and an organ for
conciliation and settlement of disputes."11 0 In 1986, the original
GATT agreement underwent a considerable change during the
Uruguay Round, at which point the negotiators agreed to add to
the original text all adopted decisions by the GATT Contracting
Parties since 1947.111 The new, or updated, agreement has been

termed "GATT 1994," and is in fact a "negative integration-type of
contract": members "bind their classic trade instruments and are
essentially free to define unilaterally all other policies which
might affect trade .

.

. provided that they respect the principle of

Id. at 119.
107. Id. The GATT was not intended to be a fully independent legal body;
rather, its function was to act as an interim measure to put into effect the
commercial policy provisions of the ITO. However, although fifty-three
countries finally signed the ITO Charter in March 1948, the decision of the
U.S. Congress to vote against its ratification left GATT as the sole ("interim")
framework for regulating and liberalizing world trade. See AN ANATOMY OF
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

supra note 102, at 2.

108. Brand, GATT, supra note 99, at 119. The GATT mandate was to
oversee international trade in goods and to gradually liberalize that trade as
means of progressive reductions in tariff barriers. The furthering of trade
liberalization was to be achieved by negotiation "Rounds" held between
various GATT contracting parties on a regular basis. In all, there have been
eight GATT Rounds, including the Uruguay Round. See ANATOMY OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION supranote 102, at 2.
109. Brand, GATT, supra note 99, at 120.
110. Id. 'The role of the GATT as a forum for trade negotiation has been
emphasized by the eight rounds of trade negotiations conducted under its
auspices," and at the same time, "membership in the group of contracting
parties has grown from the original twenty-three countries to over one
hundred, with nearly thirty additional countries applying the GATT on a de
facto basis." Id. at 120-21.
111. See PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE 11

(2005).
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non-discrimination." 1 12 Members to the GATT are obligated "to
respect non-discrimination any time they intervene in their
market through regulatory means," thus causing trade to be
affected; for example, conferring an advantage on domestic
manufacturers in competition with foreign manufacturers, would
violate the cornerstone principle of non-discrimination under the
GATT.113
For the purposes of this Comment, the most significant aspect
of the Agreement is Article III and its non-discrimination
principle.11 4
This standard of non-discrimination requires
equality of treatment between domestic products and foreign
products with regard to internal taxes and other laws.115
112. See id. at 11, 21.
113. Id. at 22, 29; see Report of the Panel on Uruguayan Recourse to
Article XXIII, P 15, L/1923 (Nov. 15, 1962), GATT B.I.S.D. (11th Supp.) at 95
(1962) (procedural example of discriminatory practice allegations and
recourse between contracting parties under GATT).
114. It is important to note, however, that each of the first three Articles
of the General Agreement contain the foundation upon which the rest of the
document is built. Article I begins with the most-favored-nation principle.
The general rule is set out in Paragraph I of Article I:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on
or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the
international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with
respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with
importation
and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
GATT, supra note 97, para. 1, art. I.
A contracting party may not discriminate against trade with one
contracting party in favor of another contracting party; all other contracting
parties must be treated as favorably as any other State in the application of
tariffs and basic commercial policy rules. Meanwhile, Article II contains both
the framework of the fundamental negotiation process within the GATT
system and the statement of the preferred system of addressing
protectionism in order to work toward less restrictive trade. This principle is
set forth in paragraph 1(a) of Article II. By setting up a system of tariff
schedules based on concessions negotiated in successive "Rounds," Article II
expresses the preference of the GATT system for tariffs as the accepted
means of restriction of trade and as the focus for reducing existing trade
restrictions through the reduction of those tariffs. See generally GATT.
115. The pertinent language is set out in several paragraphs of Article III.
Paragraph 2 illustrates the concept as follows: "
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2. An Example of a Violation of the GATT
As a means to assess the consistency of legislation such as S.
1606 with the mandates of the GATT, it is helpful to consider a
scenario in which a U.S. Act was challenged as violative of the
GATT. In one case, Section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 was
targeted as a violation of the non-discrimination principle set forth
in Article III of GATT.116 Under Section 337:
[U]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the
importation of articles into the United States, or in their
sale, are unlawful if they tend to destroy or substantially
injure an industry efficiently and economically operated
in the United States, prevent the establishment of such
an industry, or restrain or monopolize trade and
17
commerce in the United States.1
There, the GATT Panel found various aspects of Section 337
discriminatory and thus inconsistent with Article 111.118 The
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into
accorded
shall
be
the territory of any other contracting party
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph
transportation
shall not prevent the application of differential
charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the
means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.
See GATT, supra note 97, para. 2, art. III. See also Ronald A. Brand,
Private Parties and GATT Dispute Resolution: Implications of the Panel
Report on Section 337 of the US Tariff Act of 1930, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 8
(1990).
116. See GATT, Art. III; Tariff Act of 1930, Section 337, 46 Stat. 703-04
(1930) amended by 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958)); Brand, Private Parties,supra
note 115, at 6, 8, 19.
117. See Brand, Private Parties,supra note 115, at 19.
118. See id. The Panel found six factors that rendered Section 337
inconsistent with Article III of the GATT, four of which went unjustified by
other exceptions enumerated by the GATT. These four U.S. violations of
GATT obligations included: the "availability to complainants of a choice of
forum in which to challenge imported products, whereas no corresponding
choice is available to challenge products of U.S. origin"; "the potential
disadvantage to producers or importers of challenged products of foreign
origin resulting from the tight and fixed time-limits in proceedings under
Section 337, when no comparable time-limits apply to producers of challenged
products of U.S. origin"; "the non-availability of opportunities in Section 337
proceedings to raise counterclaims, as is possible in federal district court
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Panel thus demonstrated that Article III applies to procedural
measures enacted by the U.S., "remov[ing] any doubt that the
Article III prohibitions against discriminatory treatment apply
equally to procedural, as well as to substantive, laws, regulations
or requirements."1 9 This aspect of the Panel's report was
particularly noteworthy because, after the challenge to Section
337, procedural differences constitute violations of Article 111.120
Therefore, the ultimate "issue is not whether you treat the
foreign defendant the same as a domestic defendant once
proceedings have begun; it is whether you offer the domestic
plaintiff a procedural advantage available where foreign products
are involved that is not available where domestic products are
1
involved." 12
3. S.1606 and GATT
At first glance, S. 1606 seems very similar to Section 337.
Both create procedural differences between foreign and domestic
litigants, confer different obligations on involved parties, and each
seems to confer procedural advantages on domestics that are not
in place for foreigners. Indeed, S.1606 seems to create the precise
sort of procedural difference that violates Article III as it might
give rise to instances of procedural advantages that are not there
Generally, when world trade
for foreign manufacturers.
regulations and civil procedure mechanisms overlap and
procedural advantages are created, objections identical to those
raised in the Section 337 dispute will certainly be raised. Here, at
its simplest, S. 1606 requires a foreign defendant to register
locally while U.S. manufacturers apparently need not follow the
same procedure, and so procedural advantages for domestic
plaintiffs exist that are not shared by foreign litigants.
This analysis, however, is far too simplistic. The apparent
similarities between Section 337 and S.1606 are not as obvious as
proceedings"; and "the possibility that producers or importers of challenged
products of foreign origin may have to defend their products both before the
USITC and in federal district courts, whereas no corresponding exposure
exists with respect to products of US origin". Brand, Private Parties, supra
note 115, at 20.
119. See id. at 21.
120. See Telephone Interview with Ronald A. Brand, Professor of Law,
University of Pittsburgh School of Law (Nov. 12, 2009).
121. See Brand, PrivateParties,supra note 115, at 24.
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they may seem. In fact, S. 1606 is entirely different than Section
While Section 337 made it easier to target foreign
337.
manufacturers than domestic manufacturers, S. 1606 does not
make it easier to serve or obtain personal jurisdiction over foreign
manufacturers, but rather institutes procedure to sue foreign
manufacturers where none existed in the past. S. 1606 would
require the consent of foreign manufacturers to one particular
jurisdiction for personal jurisdiction and service purposes and in
truth, this procedure is hardly different from that imposed upon
domestic manufacturers.12 2 All American manufacturers are
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of at least one state in the
U.S., and often jurisdiction can be obtained in multiple states. S.
1606, therefore, would comply with Article III of the GATT as it
does not discriminate against foreign defendants, for these
foreigners will not be subjected to burdens not already imposed on
domestic defendants.
Therefore, S. 1606 is consistent with U.S. treaty obligations
under the GATT. It does not aim to create procedural advantages
as between domestic and foreign manufacturers, instead only
seeks to "level the playing field" by instituting amendments to a
system that would otherwise provide procedural escape routes to
foreign manufacturers avoiding litigation in the U.S. Indeed, S.
1606 is not making it more difficult for foreign manufacturers to
operate in the U.S. market, nor is it going as far as to suggest that
foreign corporations can now be sued in any state. The system
operates equally on domestic manufacturers and foreign
manufacturers. If a company conducts business in a state,
registration in that state is necessary-it is the equivalent of
designation of an agent. This does not necessarily equate to
consent, but rather provides a recipient for service of process. A
U.S. manufacturer can be sued in multiple states-at the very
least, in the state of its principal place of business, or in its state
122. See S. 1606. Because the foreign manufacturer would be required to
designate an agent in only one state, the Act would not even subject a foreign
manufacturer to suit nationwide without minimum contacts analysis or
litigation. Also of note, a foreign manufacturer "could designate an agent for
service in a state with laws more favorable to manufacturers," proving
further that, if anything, the advantage still lies with foreign manufacturers
once subjected to litigation in the U.S. See Teitz, Leveling the Playing Field,
supra note 23.
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of incorporation or domicile. With the passage of S.606, foreign
manufacturers would hardly find themselves at a disadvantage as
they are merely being subjected to the same system. In fact, they
maintain an advantage because they need only designate an agent
in one state and do not necessarily have a principal place of
business. Of course the foreign manufacturer could conceivably be
sued in another state if a minimum contacts argument can be
made, but that matter would need to be analyzed and would very
likely be litigated, and the aim of S. 1606 is to eliminate such
front-loaded costs. In effect, the foreign defendant simply must
choose its domicile by designating an agent in a U.S. state. In the
end, this is no different than what a U.S. corporation must do, and
in truth is still easier on foreign manufacturers.
D. Enforcement
S. 1606 does not address the difficulties associated with
enforceability of any judgment that might be awarded. If the
losing party foreign manufacturer lacks assets, or has insufficient
assets in the U.S., it will be nearly impossible for plaintiffs to
Consent to
recover the full value of the award elsewhere.
jurisdiction certainly does not amount to payment of any
judgment awarded. Therefore, "unless the producer has assets in
the U.S., an American court judgment against an uncooperative
[foreign] defendant might as well be recycled as scrap paper,
12 3
because the document is pretty much worthless."
While the bill might be criticized for overlooking the issue of
enforcement, the unfortunate truth is that enforcement simply is
not a realistic goal for this type of legislation, or any domestic
legislation. The bill purports only to surmount the procedural
hurdles of personal jurisdiction and service, not to guarantee
enforcement of subsequent judgments. In no way does this
legislation hope to correct and account for every situation. Rather,
it is a means of eliminating the costly litigation that inevitably
arises at the outset of suits against foreign manufacturers. On the
rare occasion that foreign companies have little or no assets on
U.S. soil, problems will continue to plague U.S. plaintiffs as they
will be unlikely to receive their award. This frustrating reality is
123.

See

LITIGATION,

CHINA HEARSAY, supra note 94.
supranote 37, at 251-90.

See also

TRANSNATIONAL
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most readily expressed in the difficulties of both identifying and
holding accountable the manufacturers of component parts,
especially when these are fungible items such as toys and drywall,
often unlabeled, or perhaps bearing only the name of the country
from which they originated. The manufacturers of these products
will continue to elude the system under this bill; however, the
foreign companies that purchase and use these component parts
would have strong incentive to keep track of the manufacturers of
the faulty parts. Assuming there is a contract between those
parties, indemnification will be a matter to be settled between
those defendants. Meanwhile, the U.S. plaintiff, with the help of
this bill, would ideally recover damages from the manufacturer of
the completed product, who will then seek out and demand
indemnification from the truly responsible party.
Perhaps it must be conceded that the U.S., or any country for
that matter, will never be able to regulate enforcement of
judgments. Conventions facing this issue have tried and failed in
their negotiations regarding the problem of enforcement. The
Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters never became
effective, and the difficulties, or perhaps impossibilities,
associated with creating multilateral recognition of enforcing
judgments proved overwhelming and insuperable.12 4 As such, it is
most appropriate to view S. 1606 not as an attempt to resolve
swiftly an age-old dilemma of enforcement, but as a means to
ameliorate the lengthy and costly litigation of initial procedural
barriers. Indeed, the issue of enforcement cannot be resolved by
124. See Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, supra note 3, at 117.
See also The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S.
249. The 2001 draft text of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, an interim text, was drawn up
at Part One of the Nineteenth Diplomatic Session, which was held from June
6, 2001 to June 22, 2001. Hague Conference, Summary of the Outcome of the
Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference,
June 6-22, 2001 (prepared by the Permanent Bureau and the Co-reporters).
Not only was that document of the "unilateral" variety, thus leaving
signatories free to claim jurisdiction on their own idiosyncratic grounds
(though an optional "Supplementary Protocol" would have eliminated
exorbitant jurisdictional bases), but its implementation also required the
cumbersome further step of executing bilateral agreements between those
nations that wanted to avail themselves of its provisions.
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domestic legislation and must instead be undertaken in the
international arena.
V. CONCLUSION

With the high volume of foreign-made products shipped into
the U.S. from day to day, it seems only natural that the U.S. adopt
legislation to better enable its consumers to seek redress if these
products from abroad ultimately injure them.
S. 1606, the
Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act, is an ideal bill to
effectuate simpler and more effective means of suing foreign
manufacturers, and the bill also serves the underlying health and
safety policies by encouraging foreign manufacturers to produce
safe items for export. Indeed, this bill is good policy on these
multiple fronts. 125 Rather than changing any substantive law, the
bill focuses on procedural aspects alone to make litigation against
foreign manufacturers less time-consuming and expensive.
Meanwhile, the competitive advantage enjoyed by foreign
manufacturers over U.S. manufacturers would be eliminated,
replaced by a system that would induce foreign manufacturers to
comply with the same American safety standards with which
domestic manufacturers must comply. This in turn results in
safer, less hazardous products in the U.S. marketplace, which is
always an aim of public policy.
Though the bill has not generated any recent attention,
interest in the bill's policies, and at least an awareness of the
issues it underscores, may gain momentum.
Immediately
following Senator Whitehouse's proposal of S. 1606, the bill
received attention from various media outlets in Washington and
beyond, and the bill gradually earned the support of a number of
senators. 126 In the wake of Senator Ted Kennedy's passing and
125. In addition to the benefits of S. 1606 discussed above, an important
corollary of the bill is that it demonstrates the reality that procedural
mechanisms and procedural law can have a very significant impact on trade.
An increasing interrelationship between trade policy and dispute resolution
is emerging, as noted by scholars in the field. For example, the free trade
agreement ratified by the United States with Australia actually addresses
the enforcement of judgments in the context of trade restraints and
competition. See United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement art. 14.7,
U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004, available at http:lwww.ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements /austrahan-fta.
126. Reporters and bloggers alike took to the issue, and the National
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the subsequent enthusiasm about pursuing health care-related
agendas, however, S. 1606 faded into the background. This
unfortunate timing worked against the bill in its earliest months
at Senate, but now the bill stands to attract much greater
attention with the American Association for Justice's devotion to
2010 as the "Dawning of a New 'Decade of Corporate
Accountability."'1 27 S.1606 is listed among the focuses of the AAJ
for the coming years as the Association plans to take aim at
corporate accountability and fortification of basic legal protections
in the U.S.
Ideally, S. 1606 will pass into law; if not, further efforts must
be made to deal with the inadequacies of the legal system and the
inequities between foreign and domestic manufacturers.
Currently, the system simply is not fit to deal with the problem of
successfully suing foreign manufacturers; case law, rules, and
policy have developed for internal, domestic use, thus it is no
wonder why current procedure fails to capture the nuanced
challenges associated with suing foreign manufacturers.
Implementing the procedure outlined in S. 1606 would reduce and
perhaps eliminate the front-loaded costs associated with litigation
of the preliminary matter of personal jurisdiction, an
automatically-raised defense to nearly every suit by nearly every
The bill would demand
foreign manufacturer defendant.
accountability from foreign manufacturers and in doing so would
Public Radio's Marketplace reported on it as well. See Dan Grech, Bill eases
how U.S. sues foreign firms, Aug. 13, 2009, available at http://marketplace.
publicradio.org/display/web/2009/08/13/am-florida-drywall.
127. See Ray De Lorenzi, AAJ:2010 Dawning of New"Decade of Corporate
2010),
(Jan. 11,
Accountability," AM. ASS'N. FOR JUST.,
http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/justice/hs.xs1l1430.htm.
'With the last ten years marred by a culture of protecting negligent
corporations, the worst financial crisis in a generation, and a
constant assault on the rights of workers and consumers, the
American people will increasingly demand stronger consumer
protections and resist big business attempts to undermine the civil
justice system,' said American Association for Justice (AAJ)
President Anthony Tarricone at a press briefing today. 'Coming off
an era in which corporations - from Enron to AIG - were allowed to
trump the interests of everyday Americans, the civil justice system
will be the centerpiece of a new "decade of corporate accountability"
that will balance the playing field that today tilts too much in favor
of powerful corporate interests.'
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finally put domestic and foreign manufacturers on even footing in
the marketplace. With manufacturers both domestic and foreign
playing by the same rules and subject to the same legal
ramifications, American consumers would see safer products
circulated and an unprecedented ease of suit against foreign
manufacturers who continue to produce defective products. The
difference, however, would be that the foreign manufacturers of
these defective products would no longer enjoy the escape routes of
our currently defective system.

